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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WESTERN COATING, INC., an Oregon
Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 880289
vs.
GIBBONS & REED, a Utah corporation,
AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, a
a Utah Corporation and CONTINENTALHAGEN, a Utah Corporation
Defendants and Respondents
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff

and Appellant Western Coating,

Inc. ("Appellant

Western Coating"), by and through its counsel of record, hereby
submits this Brief.
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated, Section 78-2-2(3), (1953, as amended).
Defendants
Insurance

and Respondents

Company

Gibbons

("Respondent Gibbons

& Reed
& Reed

and American
and Respondent

American Insurance Company or Respondents") brought a Motion for
Summary Judgment before the lower court on June 6, 1988.
that hearing,

the lower court was asked to determine

At

whether

Appellant Western Coating's claim on the payment bond fell within
the

scope of protection of the Utah Procurement

Section 63-56-38, 1953 as amended. (R. 67).

Code, U.C.A.

The lower court submitted a Memorandum Decision in the
matter granting the Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment. (R.
68).

The lower court ruled that Appellant Western Coating was

too remote in the contract chain from the general contractor to
come within the protection of the Utah Procurement Code and
therefore its claim was barred.
on July 1, 1988. (R. 72).

(R. 68). Judgement was entered

Appellant Western Coating filed a

Notice of Appeal in this matter on July 27, 1988. (R. 74).
Default judgment had previously been entered against Defendant
Continental-Hagen.

(R. 15). Said default judgment is not a part

of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Whether Appellant Western Coating's claim for payment of
materials that were admittedly supplied to and incorporated into
a project in which a payment bond was obtained pursuant to the
Utah Procurement Code should be denied simply because it is a
supplier in the third tier.
CONTROLLING STATUTE
The controlling

statute

in this matter

is Utah

Code

Annotated, Section 63-56-38 (1985), hereinafter referred to as
the "Utah Procurement Code."

A copy of the 1985 enactment of the

Utah Procurement Code is found in the Appendix.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Utah Department

of Transportation

entered

into a

contract with Respondent Gibbons & Reed on or about April 8, 1986
for the construction of the road located at 11th East to 20th
2

East and 1-215 in Salt Lake City (the "Project").

(R. 46). In

accordance with Utah's Procurement Code, Respondent Gibbons &
Reed obtained a payment bond from Respondent American Insurance
Company for the protection of those supplying labor and materials
to the Project. (R. 46).
Respondent Gibbons & Reed entered into a subcontract with
Pacheco & Martinez wherein Pacheco & Martinez agreed to furnish
and install black and epoxy reinforcing steel on the Project. (R.
46).

Pacheco and Martinez then entered into a contract with

Continental-Hagen

for the purchase of the black

and epoxy

reinforcing steel. (R. 46). Appellant Western Coating contracted
with Continental-Hagen to supply Continental-Hagen with epoxy
coated re-bar for use on the Project. (R. 3 ) .
Continental-Hagen failed to pay Appellant Western Coating
the balance due of $30,904.80 for said materials.

(R. 4 ) .

Appellant Western Coating made timely demand upon Respondents for
payment for the materials it furnished for use on the Project
under the payment bond that was furnished pursuant to the
Procurement Code. (R. 4 ) .
SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT
It is Appellant's position that the Utah Procurement Code
stands in lieu of the mechanic's lien statute on public work
projects.

Just as the mechanic's lien statute protects all who

provide labor and materials related to the improvement of real
property, the Procurement Code is designed to protect all those

3

who

supply

labor

and

materials

to

state

owned

public

work

projects.
Further, the reference to "subcontractor" in the Procurement
Code

does

materials

not
to

preclude
the

some

project

parties

from

that

bringing

provided
claims

labor
under

or
the

Procurement Code based on their position in the contract chain.
Thus,

Appellant

Western

Coating,

as a supplier

of

materials

utilized in the construction of the Project, may bring a claim
for payment for materials utilized in the Project pursuant to the
provisions of the Utah Procurement Code.
Finally, federal case law relating to the Miller Act is not
dispositive.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE PROCUREMENT CODE STANDS IN LIEU OF THE
MECHANIC'S LIEN ON PUBLIC WORK PROJECTS AS PROTECTION FOR THOSE
WHO SUPPLY LABOR AND MATERIALS TO THE PROJECTS.
It is Appellant Western Coating's position that the Utah
Procurement Code stands in lieu of the mechanic's lien statutes
and

is

designed

to

protect

public

those who

for

supplies

labor

included

within the scope of protection provided

materials

Thus,
to

any

supply

materials

or

works.

all

party

a public

that

project

labor

and

actually
should

be

by the Utah

Procurement Code.
Utah courts have long recognized the relation between the
mechanic's lien law and the bonding statutes.

This relationship

was recently reaffirmed in Cox Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline
Construction 754 P.2d 672 (Utah App., 1988).
4

In Cox Rock Products, the Court of Appeals of Utah was asked
to review whether the statutes relied on by a supplier to a
subcontractor to Ephraim City seeking to recover on a payment
bond were in effect at the relevant times.

In making its

determination, the Court of Appeals reviewed the history of the
statutes relating to mechanic's liens and payment bonds.
The Court of Appeals began their review of the history of
said statutes by stating the following:
Ordinarily, one who is not in "privity" with another cannot
sue that party to recover on a contract. . . . However, to
protect construction suppliers and subcontractors from the
harshness of that doctrine, two principal devices have been
created -- the mechanic's lien and the payment bond.
(Emphasis added.)
Id. at 673.
As the mechanic's lien statute precludes the filing of liens
on public buildings, structures or improvements, " . . . suppliers
and subcontractors have principally looked for protection to the
second device, namely that of the payment bond, when providing
labor or supplies for construction projects contracted for by
governmental entities."

(Emphasis added.) Id. at 674.

In King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 374 P.2d 254
(Utah, 1962), Utah's Supreme Court stated that "This contractors
bond statute is closely related in purpose. . . to that of our
mechanics lien statute. . ."

King Bros, at 255.

In Crane Co. v. Utah Motor Park, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 413, 335
P.2d 837 (1959), the court stated:
. The purpose of the mechanics and materialmen's lien statutes
and likewise the statutes quoted hereinabove, [the private
payment bond statutes] is to prevent the owners of land from
5

having their lands improved with the materials and labor
furnished and performed by a third person, and thus to
enhance the value of such lands, without becoming personally
responsible for the reasonable value of the materials and
labor which enhance the value of those lands. The owner may
escape personal liability by obtaining the bond as required
by the statute, (footnote omitted)
Crane at 839.
The mechanic's lien statute has always recognized that every
supplier to a project falls within the scope of its protection.
The mechanic's lien statute, U.C.A. Section 38-1-3 (1953, as
amended),

states

that

those

entitled

to

the

lien

are

"Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any
services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment used
in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any building
or structure. . . . "

(Emphasis added.)

The mechanic's lien

statute does not distinguish amongst parties based on their
relation to the general contractor.

Likewise, the Procurement

Code is not intended to distinguish amongst parties based on
their relation to the general contractor.
As the mechanic's lien statute and the bonding statutes are
similar in purpose, all suppliers to a project should be included
within the scope of protection provided by the Utah Procurement
Code.

Appellant Western Coating indisputably provided materials

to a public project.

Appellant Western Coating was not paid in

full for the materials it provided to this Project.

Appellant

Western Coating is precluded by law from filing a mechanic's lien
on the Project.

Appellant Western Coating's only recourse is on

the payment bond which was provided for the protection of those
6

who provided labor and materials to the Project.

The lower court

erred in ruling that Appellant Western Coating was too remote to
fall within the scope of protection of the Procurement Code.

The

payment bonds provided pursuant to the Procurement Code are for
the protection of all who provide labor and materials to a public
project.

POINT II.
THE TERM "SUBCONTRACTOR," AS USED IN THE
PROCUREMENT CODE, ENCOMPASSES ALL WHO PROVIDE LABOR AND MATERIALS
TO A PUBLIC PROJECT.
The Utah Procurement Code states:
Any person who has furnished labor or material to the
contractor or subcontractor for the work provided for in the
contract, in respect of which a payment bond is furnished
under this section, who has not been paid in full therefor
within 90 days from the date on which the last of the labor
was performed by him or material was supplied by him for
which the claim is made, may sue on the payment bond for any
amount unpaid at the time the suit is instituted and may
prosecute the action for the amount due him. (Emphasis
added.)
The language of the Procurement Code was not intended to bar
claims of those not in direct privity with the general contractor
or the first tier subcontractor.

The Procurement Code is for

the protection of those parties that provide labor or materials
as provided for in the contract.
contends

Appellant Western Coating

that the use of the term

"subcontractor"

in the

Procurement Code is used generically and should not be used to
drive a wedge between those who provide labor or material equally
vital to the work provided for in the contract.
Colorado's Supreme Court, in South-way Construction Co. v.
Adams City Service, 458 P.2d 250, 251 (Colorado, 1969), faced an
7

issue practically identical to the present issue, and determined
that a supplier to a sub-subcontractor could bring a claim for
payment under a payment bond provided pursuant to Colorado's
public bonding statute.
Colorado's public bonding statute states that a claim may be
filed by any person who has furnished labor or materials "used or
consumed by such contractor or his subcontractor, in or about the
performance of the work contracted to be done.

This language

referring to "contractors and subcontractors" is very similar to
the language of Utah's Procurement Code.

However, Colorado's

Supreme Court did not find that the language referencing a
subcontractor was limiting with respect to which parties could
file claims.

In making

its determination

that

the

term

subcontractor has a very broad meaning, Colorado's Supreme Court
stated:
To construe the term "subcontractor" so as to exclude a
"sub-subcontractor" from the protection granted by the
contractor's bond statute would require us to ignore the
purpose of the statute.
Since the benefits of our
mechanic's lien act do not apply to projects constructed by
governmental agencies, a remedy similar to our mechanic's
lien statute was provided by the legislature for the
protection of those furnishing supplies or material for such
projects. . . The statute stands in lieu of the mechanic's
lien statute and is designed to protect those who supply
labor and materials for public works."
South-way Construction Co. v. Adams City Service, 458 P.2d
250, 251 (Colorado, 1969).
Likewise, under Massachusetts law, suppliers to a subsubcontractor or second-tier subcontractor are protected under
the public bonding statute.

In Peters v. Hartford Accident and

8

Indemnity Company, 389 N.E.2d 63, (Mass. 1979), the Massachusetts
Supreme Court was asked to review whether the

legislature

intended to curtail the scope of coverage of the public bonding
statute by its 1972 amendment which states:
Any claimant having a contractual relationship with a
subcontractor performing labor or both performing labor and
furnishing materials pursuant to a contract with the general
contractor but no contractual relationship with the
contractor principal furnishing the bond shall have the
right to enforce any such claim as provided . . .
In making its determination regarding the above language,
the court first stated that the public bonding statute is an
outgrowth of the mechanics' lien statutes which do not have
distinctions between subcontractors and is to provide security to
those who furnish labor or materials to public works.
The court went on to rule:
We do not construe the words, f[a]ny claimant having a
contractual relationship with a subcontractor performing
. . . pursuant to a contract with the general' as barring
all claims against a subcontractor not in direct privity
with the general contractor. . . Rather, it more generally
signifies acts done in accordance with, by reason of, in
agreement with, or in the prosecution of, the contract. . .
Ultimately, a sub-subcontractor who performs a portion of
the contract performs it 'pursuant to a contract with the
general contractor,' although his relationship with the
contract is indirect . . . Finally, the result we reach
furthers the public policy of ensuring security for all
laborers working at a public project site, and thereby
promotes the unhampered completion of such projects.
(Emphasis added)
Peters at 67, 68.
Appellant Western Coating requests this court to adopt the
position taken by the Colorado and Massachusetts state courts and
rule that all entities providing labor or materials to public
projects fall within the protection of Utah's Procurement Code.
9

POINT III. DECISIONS RELATING TO THE FEDERAL MILLER ACT ARE
NOT DISPOSITIVE OF ISSUES RELATING TO THE UTAH PROCUREMENT CODE.
In the lower court proceeding, Respondents relied on court
rulings relating to the Miller Act.

The Miller Act is the

federal government's public bonding statute and federal courts,
based on federal legislative history, have ruled that suppliers
to materialmen cannot recover under public contractor's bonds
provided pursuant to the Miller Act.

Some state courts have

adopted similar rulings to the Miller Act when ruling on this
issue.
Even

though

Utah's

public

bonding

statutes

have, on

occasion, been referred to as the "Little Miller Act, ffl Utah is
not bound to adopt federal court case law interpreting the Miller
Act when ruling on issues relating to Utah's Procurement Code.
Federal case law relating to the Miller Act is not controlling on
this specific issue relating to the Utah Procurement Code.

And,

as presented in this Brief, other state courts have not felt
bound to Miller Act case law when interpreting their respective
states' public bonding statutes.
In State of New Mexico, ex. rel. W.M. Carroll & Co. v. K.L.
House Construction Co., Inc., 656 P.2d

1

236 (N.M. 1982), New

In Cox Rock Products, the Appellate Court referred to
Utah's original public bonding statute, U.C.A. Section 14-1-5 as
the "Little Miller Act." While providing similar relief to that
of the Miller Act, said Section is not identical to the Miller
Act. It has been amended numerous times and it was even repealed
in 1980 and then reenacted in 1983. Further said section is not
even the statute which governs the instant matter, although it
provides similar relief.
10

Mexicof s Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a third tier
supplier was entitled to protection under New Mexico's "Little
Miller Act."

The trial court had determined, on summary

judgment, that the third tier supplier was entitled to protection
under New Mexico's

"Little Miller Act."

New Mexico's Supreme Court began its discussion with, "The
Little Miller Act is modeled after the federal Miller Act. . .
These statutes are intended to provide a remedy equivalent to
that of a materialmen's lien, which ordinarily may not attach to
government property."

Carroll & Co. at 236.

While acknowledging

that the federal courts have determined that suits may only be
brought

under

the Miller Act by parties having

a direct

contractual relationship with the general or a subcontractor who
in turn deals directly with the general contractor, the New
Mexico court reached a different result with respect to their
"Little Miller Act."
The New Mexico Supreme Court stated:
We recognize that the federal cases are contrary, but those
cases rely on legislative history which is inapplicable to the
New Mexico statute.
Our conclusion is supported by analogy to the provisions
governing mechanic's and materialmen's liens. Under Section 482-2, N.M.S.A. 1978, a party in Carroll's position would have a
lien on the building if the construction project were private.
Because the project involved here is governmental, no lien can
attach.
Carroll & Co., at 237, 238.
Thus, the court held that New Mexico's "Little Miller Act"
provided coverage to suppliers of materials under any subcontract
involving a state construction project.
11

Each state court interprets its own statutes, including
those

statutes governing

the bonding

of public projects.

Regardless of whether these statutes are even nicknamed the
"Little Miller Act," states are not bound to adopt federal Miller
Act case law when making rulings on their "Little Miller Acts."
Utah's appellate courts have not yet ruled on this issue and this
court is free to make a ruling aside from the Miller Act
decisions.
CONCLUSION
The public payment bond statutes stand in lieu of the
mechanic lien statutes on public work projects.
supplying

labor or materials

As parties

to public work projects are

prohibited from filing liens on the projects in the event they
are not paid, their only recourse is to institute an action on
the payment bonds that are provided pursuant to law.

In the

instant action, a payment bond was obtained pursuant to Utah's
Procurement Code for the protection of all who supplied labor or
materials to the Project.

Appellant Western Coating indisputably

supplied materials to the Project and was not paid for the
materials

it supplied

to the Project.

Appellant

Western

Coating's only recourse is on that payment bond which was
provided for its protection.
The references to "subcontractor" in the Procurement Code
should not limit those able to file claims under the Procurement
Code.

The term "subcontractor" is very broad and applies to

those who supply labor and materials.
12

All entities that provide

labor or materials to a state-owned project should fall within
the protection of Utah's Procurement Code.
Appellant Western Coating respectfully requests this court
to reverse the lower court's determination on Summary Judgment
that

Appellant

Western

Coating

was outside

the

scope of

protection of the Utah Procurement Code.
DATED this 29th day of December, 1988.
WALSTAD & BABCOCK

By: il]miJ\^f^b^ ^U^SmiA^wJ\
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby

certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, the

requisite copies of Appellant's Brief to Bryce Roe, Attorney for
Respondents, Fabian & Clendennin, 215 South State Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah

84111 this 29th day of December, 1988.
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APPENDIX

63-56-37

STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL

63-56-37. Bid security requirements,
(1) Bid security in amount equal to at least 5% of the amount of the bid
shall be required for all competitive sealed bidding for construction contracts.
Bid security shall be a bond provided by a surety company authorized to do
business in this state, the equivalent in cash, or any other form satisfactory to
the state.
(2) When a bidder fails to comply with the requirement for bid security set
forth in the invitation for bids, the bid shall be rejected unless, pursuant to
rules and regulations, it is determined that the failure to comply with the
security requirements is nonsubstantial.
(3) After the bids are opened, they shall be irrevocable for the period specified in the invitation for bids, except as provided in section [Subsection]
63-56-20(6). If a bidder is permitted to withdraw a bid before award, no action
shall be taken against the bidder or the bid security.
History: C. 1953, 63-56-37, enacted by L.
1980, ctu 75, § 1.

63-56-3S, Bonds necessary when contract is awarded.
(1) When a construction contract is awarded, the following bonds or security shall be delivered to the state and shall become binding on the parties
upon the execution of the contract:
(a) a performance bond satisfactory to the state, in am amount equal to
100% of the price specified in the contract, executed by a surety company
authorized to do business in this state or any other form satisfactory to
the state; and
(b) a payment bond satisfactory to the state, in an amount equal to
100% of the price specified in the contract, executed by a surety company
authorized to do business in this state or any other form satisfactory to
the state, for the protection of all persons supplying labor and material to
the contractor or its subcontractors for the performance of the work provided for in the contract.
(2) Rules may provide for waiver of the requirement of a performance or
payment bond where a bond is deemed unnecessary for the protection of the
state.
(3) Any person who has furnished labor or material to the contractor or
subcontractor for the work provided in the contract, in respect of which a
payment bond is furnished under this section, who has not been paid in full
within 90 days from the date on which the last of the labor was performed or
material was supplied by the person for whom the claim is made, may sue on
the payment bond for any amount unpaid at the time the suit is instituted and
may prosecute the action for the amount due the person. Any person having a
contract with a subcontractor of the contractor, but no express or implied
contract with the contractor furnishing the payment bond, has a right of
action upon the payment bond upon giving written notice to the contractor
and surety company within 90 days from the date on which the last of the
labor was performed or material was supplied by the person for whom the
claim is made. The person shall state in the notice the amount claimed and
the name of the party for whom the labor was performed or to whom the
584
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63-56-39

material was supplied. The notice shall be served by registered or certified
mail, postage prepaid, on the contractor and surety company at any place the
contractor or surety company maintains an office or conducts business.
(4) Any suit instituted upon a payment bond shall be brought in the district
court of the county in which the construction contract was to be performed. No
suit may be commenced by a claimant under this section more than 180 days
after a surety finally denies that claimant's claim. The obligee named in the
bond need not be joined as a party in the suit.
tor" for "in an envelope addressed to the contractor" in the last sentence of Subsection (3);
inserted "and surety company" and "or surety
company" in the last sentence of Subsection
(3); deleted "but no suit shall be commenced
later than one year from the date on which the
last of the labor was performed or material was
supplied by the person bringing the suit" at the
end of the first sentence of Subsection (4);
added the second sentence of Subsection (4);
and made minor changes in phraseology.

History: C. 1953, 63-56-38, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 75, § 1; L. 1985, ch. 202, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendment deleted "and regulations" after "Rules"
in Subsection (2); substituted "may sue" for
"shall have the right to sue" in the first sentence of Subsection (3); deleted "However" at
the beginning of the second sentence of Subsection (3); inserted "and surety company" in the
second sentence of Subsection (3); deleted "personally or" after "served" in the last sentence
of Subsection (3); substituted "on the contrac-

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Burden of proof.
Timeliness of action.
Work performed without contract.
Burden of proof.
In action by materialman on payment bond,
materialman did not have the burden to prove
that the materials furnished were actually delivered to the job site or that they were actually incorporated into the structure, but only
that the materials were furnished in connection with the particular project. City Elec. v.
Industrial Indem. Co., 683 P.2d 1053 (Utah
1984).
Timeliness of action.
The appropriate test for determining
whether an action on a payment bond was
brought within the required statutory time period was not the "substantial completion" date;
it was rather whether the material in question

was supplied as a part of the original contract
or for the purpose of correcting defects or making repairs following inspection of the project.
City Elec. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 683 P.2d
1053 (Utah 1984).
Work performed without contract.
Where construction company proceeded to
demolish race track and install a soccer field
for Utah Golden Spikers and state of Utah
without an executed agreement and without
compliance with § 64-1-4, there was no contract with the state of Utah by which it was
obliged to require the Golden Spikers to furnish performance and payment bonds.
Breitling Bros. Constr. v. Utah Golden
Spikers, Inc., 597 P.2d 869 (Utah 1979).

63-56-39. Form of bonds — Effect of certified copy.
The form of the bonds required by this part shall be established by rules and
regulations. Any person may obtain from the state a certified copy of a bond
upon payment of the cost of reproduction of the bond and postage, if any. A
certified copy of a bond shall be prima facie evidence of the contents, execution, and delivery of the original.
585

